From 6e355131670ad014e45f879475ddf800f0080d41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 12:35:04 -0800 Subject: Make 'fscrypt setup' offer a choice of directory modes World-writable directories are not appropriate for some systems, so offer a choice of single-user-writable and world-writable modes, with single-user-writable being the default. Add a new documentation section to help users decide which one to use. --- cli-tests/t_status.out | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'cli-tests/t_status.out') diff --git a/cli-tests/t_status.out b/cli-tests/t_status.out index 0d478b5..eb425d0 100644 --- a/cli-tests/t_status.out +++ b/cli-tests/t_status.out @@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ ext4 supported Yes ext4 supported Yes # Get status of setup mountpoint -ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies +ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies. +All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem. -ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies +ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies. +All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem. # Get status of unencrypted directory on setup mountpoint -- cgit v1.2.3 From 74e870b7bd1585b4b509da47e0e75db66336e576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 12:35:04 -0800 Subject: Strictly validate metadata file ownership by default The metadata validation checks introduced by the previous commits are good, but to reduce the attack surface it would be much better to avoid reading and parsing files owned by other users in the first place. There are some possible use cases for users sharing fscrypt metadata files, but I think that for the vast majority of users it is unneeded and just opens up attack surface. Thus, make fscrypt (and pam_fscrypt) not process policies or protectors owned by other users by default. Specifically, * If fscrypt or pam_fscrypt is running as a non-root user, only policies and protectors owned by the user or by root can be used. * If fscrypt is running as root, any policy or protector can be used. (This is to match user expectations -- starting a sudo session should gain rights, not remove rights.) * If pam_fscrypt is running as root, only policies and protectors owned by root can be used. Note that this only applies when the root user themselves has an fscrypt login protector, which is rare. Add an option 'allow_cross_user_metadata' to /etc/fscrypt.conf which allows restoring the old behavior for anyone who really needs it. --- cli-tests/t_status.out | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'cli-tests/t_status.out') diff --git a/cli-tests/t_status.out b/cli-tests/t_status.out index eb425d0..058c62c 100644 --- a/cli-tests/t_status.out +++ b/cli-tests/t_status.out @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ext4 supported Yes ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies. All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem. -ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies. +ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies (only including ones owned by fscrypt-test-user or root). All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem. -- cgit v1.2.3