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ErrBadConfig:
Fix backwards wrapping, include the bad config, and make it
clear that this is an internal error.
ErrBadConfigFile:
Fix backwards wrapping, include the config file location, and
adjust the suggestion slightly.
ErrConfigFileExists:
Include the config file location.
ErrNoConfigFile:
Include the config file location, and adjust the suggestion
slightly.
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'fscrypt lock' on a v1-encrypted directory doesn't warn about in-use
files, as the kernel doesn't provide a way to easily detect it.
Instead, implement a heuristic where we check whether a subdirectory can
be created. If yes, then the directory must not be fully locked.
Make both 'fscrypt lock' and 'fscrypt status' use this heuristic.
Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/215
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Allow overriding the mountpoint where login protectors are stored by
setting the FSCRYPT_ROOT_MNT environmental variable. The CLI tests need
this to avoid touching the real "/".
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If trying to unlock a v2-encrypted directory fails because the kernel
lacks support for v2 policies, show a better error message. This can
happen if someone downgrades their kernel or tries to access encrypted
directories on removable storage from a computer with an older kernel.
Detecting this case is difficult since all we have to go with is EACCES
when opening the directory. Implement a heuristic where if get EACCES,
we actually have read access to the directory, and the kernel doesn't
support v2 policies, we show the improved error message.
Before:
# fscrypt unlock dir
[ERROR] fscrypt unlock: open dir: permission denied
After:
# fscrypt unlock dir
[ERROR] fscrypt unlock: open dir: permission denied
This may be caused by the directory using a v2 encryption policy and
the current kernel not supporting it. If indeed the case, then this
directory can only be used on kernel v5.4 and later. You can create
directories accessible on older kernels by changing policy_version to
1 in /etc/fscrypt.conf.
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v2 encryption policies are now recommended, due to various security and
usability advantages over v1 policies. Many people have been running
into the usability problems with v1, so it's desirable to get people
onto v2 without having to manually opt-in.
Therefore, when 'fscrypt setup' creates /etc/fscrypt.conf, enable
policy_version 2 automatically if the kernel supports it.
I decided to go with this solution over the policy_version "auto" I
suggested originally because this way is simpler, it can still be
changed to "auto" later if desired, and "auto" might require changing
how we parse the config file (since currently the config file is mapped
directly to a protobuf where policy_version is an 'int' and is shared
with EncryptionOptions).
Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/182
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There's no real need to allow users to choose the key description prefix
(a.k.a. the "service"), since on ext4 and f2fs we can just use "ext4"
and "f2fs" for compatibility with all kernels both old and new, and on
other filesystems we can just use "fscrypt". So, let's do that.
Since this removes the point of the "--legacy" option to 'fscrypt setup'
and the "compatibility" field in /etc/fscrypt.conf, remove those too.
Specifically, we start ignoring the "compatibility" in existing config
files and not writing it to new ones. The corresponding protobuf field
number and name are reserved. We stop accepting the "--legacy" option
at all, although since it was default true and there was no real reason
for anyone to change it to false, probably no one will notice. If
anyone does, they should just stop specifying the option.
Note that this change only affects user keyrings and thus only affects
v1 encryption policies, which are deprecated in favor of v2 anyway.
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Ensure that when an encryption policy is reverted (e.g. due to
encryptPath() failing after the policy was created), we also delete any
new protector links that were created for the policy, as this is not
handled by the logic that reverts new protectors.
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When adding a protector to a policy, don't unconditionally overwrite the
protector link, because it may already exist. Instead, if it already
exists and points to the mount, just use it. If it already exists and
points to the wrong place, return an error.
Also add a bool to the return value of AddLinkedProtector() so that
callers can check whether the link was newly created or not.
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Ensure that a failed AddRecoveryPassphrase() doesn't leave around an
unneeded protector file.
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If the login protector was just created by the same 'fscrypt encrypt'
command, then policy.Context.Config.Source will be pam_passphrase. This
needs to be overridden to custom_passphrase when creating the protector
for the recovery passphrase.
This fixes the following error:
fscrypt encrypt: login protectors do not need a name
Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/187
Update https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/186
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If a user re-installs their system (or otherwise loses the /.fscrypt
directory on the root filesystem) they also lose access to any login
passphrase-protected directories on other filesystems, unless additional
protectors were manually added. This can be unexpected, as it may be
expected that the old login passphrase would still work.
We can't really fix this by storing a login protector on every
filesystem because:
- If a user were to have N login protectors, it would take them N times
longer to log in, as every login protector would need to be unlocked.
- If a user were to change their login passphrase while any external
volumes were unmounted, login protectors would get out of sync.
- It's preferable that an external volume isn't unlockable by itself
using only a login passphrase, as login passphrases are often weak.
Instead, generate a recovery passphrase when creating a login
passphrase-protected directory on a non-root filesystem.
The recovery passphrase is added as a custom_passphrase protector, thus
giving the policy two protectors: one pam_passphrase and one
custom_passphrase. Then this passphrase is written to a file in the new
encrypted directory. Writing the passphrase to a file here is okay
since it's encrypted, but it's obviously useless by itself; it's up to
the user to store this passphrase somewhere else if they need it.
Use a recovery passphrase instead of a "recovery code" that encodes the
policy key directly because a passphrase is more user-friendly: it can
safely be made much shorter than a key, and it works just like any other
fscrypt protector. Also, it's not as critical to allow recovery when
the .fscrypt directory on the *same* filesystem is deleted.
Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/164
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Allow root to provide the --all-users option to 'fscrypt lock' to force
an encryption key to be removed from the filesystem (i.e., force an
encrypted directory to be locked), even if other users have added it.
To implement this option, we just need to use the
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctl rather than
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
In theory this option could be implemented for the user keyrings case
too, but it would be difficult and the user keyrings are being
deprecated for fscrypt, so don't bother.
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Implement adding/removing v2 encryption policy keys to/from the kernel.
The kernel requires that the new ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY be used for this. Root is not required.
However, non-root support brings an extra complication: the kernel keeps
track of which users have called FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY for the same
key. FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY only works as one of these users, and
it only removes the calling user's claim to the key; the key is only
truly removed when the last claim is removed.
Implement the following behavior:
- 'fscrypt unlock' and pam_fscrypt add the key for the user, even if
other user(s) have it added already. This behavior is needed so that
another user can't remove the key out from under the user.
- 'fscrypt lock' and pam_fscrypt remove the key for the user. However,
if the key wasn't truly removed because other users still have it
added, 'fscrypt lock' prints a warning.
- 'fscrypt status' shows whether the directory is unlocked for anyone.
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Linux v5.4 and later supports v2 encryption policies. These have
several advantages over v1 encryption policies:
- Their encryption keys can be added/removed to/from the filesystem by
non-root users, thus gaining the benefits of the filesystem keyring
while also retaining support for non-root use.
- They use a more standard, secure, and flexible key derivation
function. Because of this, some future kernel-level fscrypt features
will be implemented for v2 policies only.
- They prevent a denial-of-service attack where a user could associate
the wrong key with another user's encrypted files.
Prepare the fscrypt tool to support v2 encryption policies by:
- Adding a policy_version field to the EncryptionOptions, i.e. to the
config file and to the policy metadata files.
- Using the kernel-specified algorithm to compute the key descriptor for
v2 policies.
- Handling setting and getting v2 policies.
Actually adding/removing the keys for v2 policies to/from the kernel is
left for the next patch.
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FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY require root
for v1 policy keys, so update the PAM module to re-acquire root
privileges while provisioning/deprovisioning policies that need this.
Also, only set up the user keyring if it will actually be used.
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Add support for 'fscrypt lock'. This command "locks" a directory,
undoing 'fscrypt unlock'.
When the filesystem keyring is used, 'fscrypt lock' also detects when a
directory wasn't fully locked due to some files still being in-use. It
can then be run again later to try to finish locking the files.
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Linux v5.4 and later allows fscrypt keys to be added/removed directly
to/from the filesystem via the new ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and
FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Among other benefits, these fix the key
visibility problems that many users have been running into, where system
services and containers can't access encrypted files.
Allow the user to opt-in to using these new ioctls for their existing
encrypted directories by setting in their /etc/fscrypt.conf:
"use_fs_keyring_for_v1_policies": true
Note that it can't really be on by default, since for v1 policies the
ioctls require root, whereas user keyrings don't. I.e., setting this to
true means that users will need to use 'sudo fscrypt unlock', not
'fscrypt unlock'. v2 policies won't have this restriction.
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In preparation for introducing support for the new filesystem-level
keyrings, move the existing user keyring management code from
security/keyring.go and crypto/crypto.go into a new package, 'keyring'.
This package provides functions AddEncryptionKey, RemoveEncryptionKey,
and GetEncryptionKeyStatus which delegate to either the filesystem
keyring (added by a later patch) or to the user keyring. This provides
a common interface to both types of keyrings, to the extent possible.
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Refer to the target User as 'targetUser' rather than simply 'target'.
This will help avoid confusion when we add support for the filesystem
keyring, since then the Mount will also be a "target".
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Use the new name for fscrypt constants and structures which have been
given a new name.
Also use the named constant for the DIRECT_KEY fscrypt policy flag.
No change in behavior. This is just preparing for future work.
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Make it clear that this refers to a type of filesystem such as "ext4",
rather than to a specific filesystem instance.
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If the user has set a restrictive umask, e.g. 0077, then
/etc/fscrypt.conf would be created without the world-readable bit set.
Fix it by overriding the umask when creating the file.
Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/151
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Show the encryption options when running 'fscrypt status' on a
directory. E.g.:
Policy: 490515286453d3f7
Options: padding:32 contents:Adiantum filenames:Adiantum
Unlocked: Yes
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These were found by a combination of manual review and a custom script
that checks for common errors.
Also removed an outdated sentence from the comment for setupBefore().
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Running "go vet -shadow ./..." finds all places where a variable might
be incorrectly or unnecessarily shadowed. This fixes some of them.
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Fixes #73.
Adds maxMemoryBytes as 128MiB and cleans up the helper
functions/variables to make it more clear which values are a number of
bytes, and which values are a number of KiB.
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Now instead of spawning a seperate thread we alternate between changing
the euid and ruid to both find the keyring and link it to the process
keyring. Note that we also ensure that the user keyring is linked into
the root keyring whenever possible.
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This user is used with policies to interface with the keryings and with
protectors to indicate which user's login passphrase should be used to
protectors of type pam_passphrase.
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'fscrypt setup' is supposed to calibrate the Argon2 password hashing
difficulty to 1s by default, but actually it was setting it to only 1s /
num_cpus because the hashing is done with all CPUs and it is timed using
the CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID clock, which measures the time spent by all
threads in the process. Fix this by dividing the elapsed time by
HashingCosts.Parallelism, which is used as the number of threads.
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Now the testing functions will skip the integration tests if a testing
filesystem is not specified.
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In addition to using callbacks, unlocked Protectors can now directly
unlock a policy. The error codes are updated to make more sense.
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This commit changes all the internal import paths from `fscrypt/foo` to
`github.com/google/fscrypt/foo` so that it can be built once we release
externaly. The documentation in README.md is updated accordingly.
Also, the README has a note noting that we do not make any guarantees
about project stability before 1.0 (when it ships with Ubuntu).
Change-Id: I6ba86e442c74057c8a06ba32a42e17f94833e280
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This commit changes the error handling for the actions package to use
the error handling library github.com/pkg/errors. This means replacing
"errors" with "github.com/pkg/errors", reworking some of the error
values, and wrapping some errors with additional context.
This commit also changes the Protector/Policy API, moving most of the
package functionality into Protector or Policy methods. These types are
now "locked" when they are queried from the filesystem, and Unlock()
must be used to get their corresponding keys. Note that only certain
operations will require unlocking the keys. Certain unnecessary
functions and methods are also removed.
This CL also fixes two bugs reported by Tyler Hicks in CreateConfigFile.
CPU time is used instead of wall time, and kiB is used instead of kB.
Change-Id: I88f45659e9fe4938d148843e3289e7b6d5b698d8
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This commit makes the callbacks for getting keys easier to understand.
Functions which need keys now take a KeyFunc callback. This callback
contains a ProtectorInfo parameter (basically a read-only version of
metadata.ProtectorData) and a boolean which indicates if the call is
being retried. The documentation is also updated to say which functions
will retry the KeyFunc.
For selecting a protector, there is now an OptionFunc callback which
takes a slice of ProtectorOptions. A ProtectorOption is a ProtectorInfo
along with additional information about a linked filesystem (if
applicable).
This commit also adds in methods for getting the protector options for a
specific filesystem or policy. It also adds a function for getting the
policy descriptor for a specific path.
Change-Id: I41e0d94ffd44e7166b0c5cf1b5d18437960bdf90
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This commit adds in the Policy structure. This structure represents an
unlocked policy key and its associated data. Policies can add or remove
Protectors, apply encryption policies to filesystem directories, and
provision a key into the kernel keyring.
Change-Id: I089710223221e0ea60188d523703469e5d67ad0e
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This commit adds in the Protector struct to the actions package. This
struct represents an unlocked Protector. They can be created from a
context or they can be unlocked using some provided data. In either
case, the data is provided via a callback mechanism.
Change-Id: I066e965b8e8e0feeba61d9c0e4472dd08965cafb
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This commit adds in the actions package. This package will be the
highest-level interface to the fscrypt packages. The public functions
in this package will be called directly from cmd/fscrypt.
The actions added in this commit pertain to creating and reading the
fscrypt global config file "fscrypt.conf". The challenging part about
creating this file is finding the correct hashing parameters for the
desired time target.
The getHashingCosts() function finds the desired costs by doubling the
costs and running the passphrase hash until the target is exceeded.
Then, a cost estimate is obtained using a linear interpolation between
the last two costs (and their time results).
Change-Id: I4a0eaf4856ec4ff49eb4360da3267f7caa9d07b2
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