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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2022-02-23 12:35:04 -0800
committerEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2022-02-23 12:35:04 -0800
commit74e870b7bd1585b4b509da47e0e75db66336e576 (patch)
tree9b67ab42cebbfd25d917852260a5300292f39630 /cli-tests
parent6e355131670ad014e45f879475ddf800f0080d41 (diff)
Strictly validate metadata file ownership by default
The metadata validation checks introduced by the previous commits are good, but to reduce the attack surface it would be much better to avoid reading and parsing files owned by other users in the first place. There are some possible use cases for users sharing fscrypt metadata files, but I think that for the vast majority of users it is unneeded and just opens up attack surface. Thus, make fscrypt (and pam_fscrypt) not process policies or protectors owned by other users by default. Specifically, * If fscrypt or pam_fscrypt is running as a non-root user, only policies and protectors owned by the user or by root can be used. * If fscrypt is running as root, any policy or protector can be used. (This is to match user expectations -- starting a sudo session should gain rights, not remove rights.) * If pam_fscrypt is running as root, only policies and protectors owned by root can be used. Note that this only applies when the root user themselves has an fscrypt login protector, which is rare. Add an option 'allow_cross_user_metadata' to /etc/fscrypt.conf which allows restoring the old behavior for anyone who really needs it.
Diffstat (limited to 'cli-tests')
-rw-r--r--cli-tests/t_encrypt.out2
-rw-r--r--cli-tests/t_single_user.out2
-rw-r--r--cli-tests/t_status.out2
-rw-r--r--cli-tests/t_v1_policy.out2
4 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/cli-tests/t_encrypt.out b/cli-tests/t_encrypt.out
index b92c9d9..ecdc46b 100644
--- a/cli-tests/t_encrypt.out
+++ b/cli-tests/t_encrypt.out
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Unlocked: Yes
Protected with 1 protector:
PROTECTOR LINKED DESCRIPTION
desc1 No custom protector "prot"
-ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 1 protector and 1 policy.
+ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 1 protector and 1 policy (only including ones owned by fscrypt-test-user or root).
All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem.
PROTECTOR LINKED DESCRIPTION
diff --git a/cli-tests/t_single_user.out b/cli-tests/t_single_user.out
index e788b3e..d038d52 100644
--- a/cli-tests/t_single_user.out
+++ b/cli-tests/t_single_user.out
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies.
Only root can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem.
-ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies.
+ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies (only including ones owned by fscrypt-test-user or root).
Only root can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem.
diff --git a/cli-tests/t_status.out b/cli-tests/t_status.out
index eb425d0..058c62c 100644
--- a/cli-tests/t_status.out
+++ b/cli-tests/t_status.out
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ext4 supported Yes
ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies.
All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem.
-ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies.
+ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 0 protectors and 0 policies (only including ones owned by fscrypt-test-user or root).
All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem.
diff --git a/cli-tests/t_v1_policy.out b/cli-tests/t_v1_policy.out
index 1f4f9d7..2353527 100644
--- a/cli-tests/t_v1_policy.out
+++ b/cli-tests/t_v1_policy.out
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ Unlocked: Partially (incompletely locked, or unlocked by another user)
Protected with 1 protector:
PROTECTOR LINKED DESCRIPTION
desc2 No custom protector "prot"
-ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 1 protector and 1 policy.
+ext4 filesystem "MNT" has 1 protector and 1 policy (only including ones owned by fscrypt-test-user or root).
All users can create fscrypt metadata on this filesystem.
PROTECTOR LINKED DESCRIPTION