The metadata validation checks introduced by the previous commits are
good, but to reduce the attack surface it would be much better to avoid
reading and parsing files owned by other users in the first place.

There are some possible use cases for users sharing fscrypt metadata
files, but I think that for the vast majority of users it is unneeded
and just opens up attack surface.  Thus, make fscrypt (and pam_fscrypt)
not process policies or protectors owned by other users by default.
Specifically,

   * If fscrypt or pam_fscrypt is running as a non-root user, only
     policies and protectors owned by the user or by root can be used.

   * If fscrypt is running as root, any policy or protector can be used.
     (This is to match user expectations -- starting a sudo session
     should gain rights, not remove rights.)

   * If pam_fscrypt is running as root, only policies and protectors
     owned by root can be used.  Note that this only applies when the
     root user themselves has an fscrypt login protector, which is rare.

Add an option 'allow_cross_user_metadata' to /etc/fscrypt.conf which
allows restoring the old behavior for anyone who really needs it.

World-writable directories are not appropriate for some systems, so
offer a choice of single-user-writable and world-writable modes, with
single-user-writable being the default.  Add a new documentation section
to help users decide which one to use.

When 'fscrypt status DIR' detects that a v1-encrypted directory is still
usable but its key seems to be absent, it shows the status as
"Unlocked: Partially (incompletely locked)".  But actually it can also
be the case that the directory is unlocked by another user.  Adjust the
status message accordingly.

This commit also fixes cli-tests/t_v1_policy.

In checkEncryptable(), check whether the directory is already encrypted
before checking whether it's empty.

Also improve the error message for when a directory is nonempty.

Finally, translate keyring.ErrKeyAddedByOtherUsers and
keyring.ErrKeyFilesOpen into errors which include the directory.

ErrAccessUserKeyring:
	Include the user, and fix the backwards wrapping.

ErrSessionUserKeyring:
	Include the user.

ErrKeyAdd:
ErrKeyRemove:
ErrKeySearch:
ErrLinkUserKeyring:
	Replace these with one-off unnamed errors because they are
	never checked for, and this makes it easier for the callers to
	provide better messages, e.g. fixing the backwards wrapping.

'fscrypt lock' on a v1-encrypted directory doesn't warn about in-use
files, as the kernel doesn't provide a way to easily detect it.

Instead, implement a heuristic where we check whether a subdirectory can
be created.  If yes, then the directory must not be fully locked.

Make both 'fscrypt lock' and 'fscrypt status' use this heuristic.

Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/215

Test using v1 encryption policies (deprecated).