The metadata validation checks introduced by the previous commits are
good, but to reduce the attack surface it would be much better to avoid
reading and parsing files owned by other users in the first place.

There are some possible use cases for users sharing fscrypt metadata
files, but I think that for the vast majority of users it is unneeded
and just opens up attack surface.  Thus, make fscrypt (and pam_fscrypt)
not process policies or protectors owned by other users by default.
Specifically,

   * If fscrypt or pam_fscrypt is running as a non-root user, only
     policies and protectors owned by the user or by root can be used.

   * If fscrypt is running as root, any policy or protector can be used.
     (This is to match user expectations -- starting a sudo session
     should gain rights, not remove rights.)

   * If pam_fscrypt is running as root, only policies and protectors
     owned by root can be used.  Note that this only applies when the
     root user themselves has an fscrypt login protector, which is rare.

Add an option 'allow_cross_user_metadata' to /etc/fscrypt.conf which
allows restoring the old behavior for anyone who really needs it.

World-writable directories are not appropriate for some systems, so
offer a choice of single-user-writable and world-writable modes, with
single-user-writable being the default.  Add a new documentation section
to help users decide which one to use.

Use %q, in case the paths contain whitespace.  Also clean the directory
path to remove trailing slashes before appending the ".new" suffix.

In checkEncryptable(), check whether the directory is already encrypted
before checking whether it's empty.

Also improve the error message for when a directory is nonempty.

Finally, translate keyring.ErrKeyAddedByOtherUsers and
keyring.ErrKeyFilesOpen into errors which include the directory.

ErrBadOwners:
	Rename to ErrDirectoryNotOwned for clarity, move it from
	cmd/fscrypt/ to metadata/ where it better belongs, and improve
	the message.

ErrEncrypted:
	Rename to ErrAlreadyEncrypted for clarity, and include the path.

ErrNotEncrypted:
	Include the path.

ErrBadEncryptionOptions:
	Include the path and bad options.

ErrEncryptionNotSupported:
ErrEncryptionNotEnabled:
	Don't wrap with "get encryption policy %s", in preparation for
	wrapping these with filesystem-level context instead.

Also avoid mixing together the error handling for the "get policy" and
"set policy" ioctls.  Make it very clear how we're handling the errors
from each ioctl.

Add general tests for 'fscrypt encrypt'.  For protector-specific tests,
see t_encrypt_custom, t_encrypt_login, and t_encrypt_raw_key.