<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>fscrypt.git/actions/recovery_test.go, branch v0.3.5</title>
<subtitle>Go tool for managing Linux filesystem encryption
</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.hodgden.net/cgit.cgi/fscrypt.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Stop using deprecated package io/ioutil</title>
<updated>2022-12-04T22:07:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-04T21:27:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.hodgden.net/cgit.cgi/fscrypt.git/commit/?id=02875cef9010633b6689cfd1e2ceec9107b756b4'/>
<id>02875cef9010633b6689cfd1e2ceec9107b756b4</id>
<content type='text'>
Since Go 1.16 (which recently became the minimum supported Go version
for this project), the package io/ioutil is deprecated in favor of
equivalent functionality in the io and os packages.  staticcheck warns
about this.  Address all the warnings by switching to the non-deprecated
replacement functions.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since Go 1.16 (which recently became the minimum supported Go version
for this project), the package io/ioutil is deprecated in favor of
equivalent functionality in the io and os packages.  staticcheck warns
about this.  Address all the warnings by switching to the non-deprecated
replacement functions.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Adjust recovery passphrase generation</title>
<updated>2021-10-05T22:30:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-14T21:12:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.hodgden.net/cgit.cgi/fscrypt.git/commit/?id=7fed63a84963cbd790e86a0e59ff14724bcf33c4'/>
<id>7fed63a84963cbd790e86a0e59ff14724bcf33c4</id>
<content type='text'>
As per the feedback at https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/115
where users didn't understand that the recovery passphrase is important,
restore the original behavior where recovery passphrase generation
happens automatically without a prompt.  This applies to the case where
'fscrypt encrypt' is using a login protector on a non-root filesystem.

However, leave the --no-recovery option so that the recovery passphrase
can still be disabled if the user really wants to.  Also, clarify the
information provided about the recovery passphrase.

Update https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/115
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As per the feedback at https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/115
where users didn't understand that the recovery passphrase is important,
restore the original behavior where recovery passphrase generation
happens automatically without a prompt.  This applies to the case where
'fscrypt encrypt' is using a login protector on a non-root filesystem.

However, leave the --no-recovery option so that the recovery passphrase
can still be disabled if the user really wants to.  Also, clarify the
information provided about the recovery passphrase.

Update https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/115
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Automatically generate recovery passphrase when useful</title>
<updated>2020-01-23T03:05:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-27T20:04:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.hodgden.net/cgit.cgi/fscrypt.git/commit/?id=8cd1b3ba2e7a12cd68e2dfd0cbb5ec09ff92783b'/>
<id>8cd1b3ba2e7a12cd68e2dfd0cbb5ec09ff92783b</id>
<content type='text'>
If a user re-installs their system (or otherwise loses the /.fscrypt
directory on the root filesystem) they also lose access to any login
passphrase-protected directories on other filesystems, unless additional
protectors were manually added.  This can be unexpected, as it may be
expected that the old login passphrase would still work.

We can't really fix this by storing a login protector on every
filesystem because:

- If a user were to have N login protectors, it would take them N times
  longer to log in, as every login protector would need to be unlocked.

- If a user were to change their login passphrase while any external
  volumes were unmounted, login protectors would get out of sync.

- It's preferable that an external volume isn't unlockable by itself
  using only a login passphrase, as login passphrases are often weak.

Instead, generate a recovery passphrase when creating a login
passphrase-protected directory on a non-root filesystem.

The recovery passphrase is added as a custom_passphrase protector, thus
giving the policy two protectors: one pam_passphrase and one
custom_passphrase.  Then this passphrase is written to a file in the new
encrypted directory.  Writing the passphrase to a file here is okay
since it's encrypted, but it's obviously useless by itself; it's up to
the user to store this passphrase somewhere else if they need it.

Use a recovery passphrase instead of a "recovery code" that encodes the
policy key directly because a passphrase is more user-friendly: it can
safely be made much shorter than a key, and it works just like any other
fscrypt protector.  Also, it's not as critical to allow recovery when
the .fscrypt directory on the *same* filesystem is deleted.

Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/164
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If a user re-installs their system (or otherwise loses the /.fscrypt
directory on the root filesystem) they also lose access to any login
passphrase-protected directories on other filesystems, unless additional
protectors were manually added.  This can be unexpected, as it may be
expected that the old login passphrase would still work.

We can't really fix this by storing a login protector on every
filesystem because:

- If a user were to have N login protectors, it would take them N times
  longer to log in, as every login protector would need to be unlocked.

- If a user were to change their login passphrase while any external
  volumes were unmounted, login protectors would get out of sync.

- It's preferable that an external volume isn't unlockable by itself
  using only a login passphrase, as login passphrases are often weak.

Instead, generate a recovery passphrase when creating a login
passphrase-protected directory on a non-root filesystem.

The recovery passphrase is added as a custom_passphrase protector, thus
giving the policy two protectors: one pam_passphrase and one
custom_passphrase.  Then this passphrase is written to a file in the new
encrypted directory.  Writing the passphrase to a file here is okay
since it's encrypted, but it's obviously useless by itself; it's up to
the user to store this passphrase somewhere else if they need it.

Use a recovery passphrase instead of a "recovery code" that encodes the
policy key directly because a passphrase is more user-friendly: it can
safely be made much shorter than a key, and it works just like any other
fscrypt protector.  Also, it's not as critical to allow recovery when
the .fscrypt directory on the *same* filesystem is deleted.

Resolves https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/164
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
